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TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND
PROSPECTIVE ADVANTAGE IN ILLINOIS
Ronald J. Broida*
Thomas J. Handler**
Legal education often depicts law as collections of abstractions which can
be cropped, bundled and forced into specific categories. Each category
represents a distinct area of law which can be denominated as contracts,
torts, property, or another such label. While this compartmentalization may
help law students deal with complex quanta of information, novice attorneys
soon discover that most areas of law are not so distinct.
For this reason, actions for tortious interference with contract and tor-
tious interference with prospective advantage' have been particularly prob-
lematic for both the bench and bar.2 Because these actions may be based
* Partner, Goldstine and Broida, Ltd., Summit, Illinois; B.A. (Political Science), Univer-
sity of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana; J.D., University of Illinois; Illinois Bar Journal Lincoln
Award.
** Partner, Thomas J. Handler & Associates, Chicago, Illinois; B.S. (Accountancy), University
of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana; J.D., DePaul University College of Law.
1. The Restatement (Second) of Torts refers to these torts as the intentional "interference
with existing or prospective contractual relations." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS introductory
note to ch. 37, at 4 (1979). The Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts succinctly
characterized the scope of these torts in its summary of the applicable provisions of the Restate-
ment as follows:
Section 766 states the rule applicable to interference by intentionally inducing or
otherwise causing a third party not to perform his contract with the injured party.
Section 766A states the rule applicable to intentional interference by preventing the
injured party from performing his own contract with a third person or by making
his performance more burdensome or expensive. Section 766B stales the rule ap-
plicable to intentional interference with prospective advantageous economic rela-
tions. Section 766C states the rule for negligent interference. Section 767 treats the
question of when interference is improper and therefore actionable. It indicates the
significant factors and describes the relative appraisal and balancing of the factors
required for making a determination in a particular case when no established privilege
has developed. Section 768 deals with competition as a proper ground for interference
with prospective relations ...
Id. introductory note to div. 9, at 2-3 (1979).
2. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 927 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. The extent of these interference torts is illustrated in the open-
ing paragraphs of a recent article by Professor Dobbs:
If I persuade you to breach your contract with another person, I have committed
a tort to that person unless I can show some special privilege to interfere....
Very similarly, if I persuade you to leave your spouse, I am liable to your spouse
under the American common law rule where it has not been changed by statute
or overruled by case law. I may also be liable for interference without direct per-
suasion if I commit an act I know will cause you to terminate your dealings with
another. It should go without saying that I am also liable if I interfere with con-
tract relations of others through tortious means, for example, by injuring or libel-
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on the conceptually distinct theories of tort, property or contract, courts
have been able to interchange recoveries traditionally reserved to each one
of these theories.' The incidence of litigation based upon tortious interference
with contract and prospective advantage has risen dramatically in recent
years,4 and, in light of the increasingly competitive pressures on businesses
and professionals, this trend can be expected to continue.' Thus, it is im-
ing one of the parties. By analogy this kind of liability may also be imposed when
there is no contract at all between the parties, and when the contract they do have
is terminable at will.
Dobbs, Tortious Interference With Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 335 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Dobbs, Tortious Interference]. One problem in analyzing the interference
torts is that there exists, as yet, no clearly established criteria for a prima facie case. As the
Restatement (Second) bf Torts states, the interference torts are intentional torts, "in the sense
that the defendant must have either desired to bring about the harm to the plaintiff or have
known that this result was substantially certain to be produced by his conduct." Also, a defend-
ant's conduct may be considered privileged in certain circumstances; nevertheless, "there is
no clearcut distinction between the requirements for a prima facie case and the requirements
for a recognized privilege." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS introductory note to ch. 37, at 4-5
(1979).
3. See, e.g., Crummer v. Zalk, 248 Cal. App. 2d 794, 57 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1967) (tortfeasor
found guilty of inducing breach of contract and held liable for plaintiff's expectancy interest);
Swaney v. Crawley, 133 Minn. 57, 157 N.W. 910 (1916) (in wrongful interference action, special
damages limited to those recoverable for breach of contract); DeLong Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen
Co., 20 A.D.2d 104, 244 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1963) (court viewed injury to a contract right as injury
to a property interest, and designated this comparison as an "elementary legal equivalence"),
aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 346, 200 N.E.2d 557, 251 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1964). But see Duff v. Engelberg,
237 Cal. App. 2d 505, 47 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965) (recovery permitted even for unforeseeable
damages resulting from wrongful interference with contract to convey real property). Most cases
involve a tort and a consequent damages claim. When damages are not apparent from the
nature of the interference, the remedies may be based on unjust enrichment. See generally D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.4, at 458 (1973) (discussion of potentially
available remedies in tortious interference actions) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS, HANDBOOK].
Other remedies available to plaintiffs include: "damages for mental suffering, loss of reputa-
tion and punitive damages," DOBBS, HANDBOOK, supra, § 6.4, at.463; liquidated damages, id.
at 463-64; restitution, id. at 465; and injunctive relief, id. at 466. See generally H. Perlman,
Interference With Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract
Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 128 (1982) (tortious remedies are appropriate when defendant
has committed unlawful acts, but those remedies "[work] at cross-purposes with contract
• . . remedies [which] promote efficiency" if applied to behavior which would be lawful except
for the interference); Note, Tortious Interference With Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth
Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1510, 1539'
(1980) (development of tortious interference liability reflects the changing concepts of property,
tort, and contract law, while the original conflict raised by this tort-'"which forms of in-
terference to permit and which to forbid-remains the central question today").
4. In general, the expansion of liability in tort law has not bypassed these torts, although
one writer opined that his fellow commentators may have assisted the expansion of the in-
terference torts "by their characterization of cases if nothing else." Dobbs, Tortious Interference,
supra note 2, at 336 & n,13. Professor Dobbs points to Dean Prosser's citation of tortious
interference cases which, according to Dobbs, "were based explicitly or could have been based
on a third-party beneficiary claim under the contract itself." Id. (citing PROSSER, supra note
2, § 129, at 935 n.17).
5. See Dobbs, Tortious Interference, supra note 2. Professor Dobbs disapproves of this
trend and retommends a "more sceptical approach .... one less committed to the unjustified
belief that liability must always expand." Id. at 376.
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portant to understand the rules, policies, and procedures surrounding in-
terference actions so that potential interference claims can be recognized.
AN OVERVIEW
In general, the interference tort remedies are designed to protect plaintiffs
from unjustifiable interference with their commercial or economic
relationships., The interference torts include interference with contract, in-
jurious falsehood, 7 and interference with prospective advantage.8 All of these
torts address the same general wrong-the deprivation of an individual's
benefits derived from commercial relations with others.9 Protected relation-
6. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 127, at 915; Harper, Interference with Contract Relations,
47 Nw. U.L. REv. 873 (1953) (this tort protects the individual's interest in the security and
integrity of his contractual and business relations); see Green, Injuries by Third Persons to
Commercial Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 1041 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Green, pt.
I]; Green, Relational Interests-Commercial Relations, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as Green, pt. II]. Dean Green noted that "[c]ommercial trade relations are the most
numerous, complex and perhaps valuable interests which men recognize." Green, pt. 1I, supra,
at 1. Dean Green also remarked that the judicial process of developing doctrines to protect these in-
terests was slow but adequate. Id. at 45.
7. The tort of "injurious falsehood" or "commercial disparagement" deals with commer-
cial or economic interferences carried out by means of false statements. Injurious falsehood
can be distinguished from defamation by the fact that in the former, the alleged statement
was not personally defamatory, yet it resulted in financial loss. This cause of action seeks
to protect legally enforceable property interests. Although injurious falsehood may be viewed
as an interference tort, it is relatively narrow in scope and will not be discussed in this article.
See generally Lynn, Injurious Falsehood, 52 FLA. B.J. 360 (1978) (discussing the origin of the
tort, the elements of a cause of action, the basis of liability, the defenses, and the scope of
relief); Comment, The Law of Commercial Disparagement: Business Defamation's Impotent
Ally, 63 YALE L.J. 65, 104 (1953) (characterizing the tort as "trade libel" and recommending
"intelligent use of the injunction" to rejuvenate this tort).
8. These torts are considered "economic" or "dignitary" torts as distinguished from those
that result in physical injury. Some acts which may serve as the basis for interference with
prospective advantage claims are more properly classified as "unfair competition." Unfair com-
petition may be carried out by interferences such as harassment, boycott, or disparagement.
It is more commonly associated with false advertising, misappropriation, "passing-off" and
fraud. Unfair competition, representing a distinct area of law, is beyond the scope of this
article. For discussions of unfair competition, see 2 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 9.01-9.20 (4th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
CALMAN]; Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARV. L. REV. 987 (1949);
Craswell, Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission, 1981
Wis. L. REV. 107; Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REv. 175 (1936).
9. A party can interfere with the formation of a contract by providing inaccurate informa-
tion, thus depriving the plaintiff of expected profit. See, e.g., Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix
Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930) (trustee falsely certified existence of securities
which plaintiff relied on as collateral for his investment). Interference with an existing trade
relationship was first recognized by the courts when defendants lured away plaintiffs' servants,
thus depriving the plaintiffs of personal services. Dobbs, Tortious Interference, supra note 2,
at 336. The tort moved beyond this limited relationship in Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216,
118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853) (defendant convinced noted singer to break her exclusive contract
with plaintiff theatre owner and was held liable for malicious procurement of a breach of
contract, even though the relationship was not strictly that of master and servant). Around
the turn of the century, American courts began recognizing interference with expected contrac-
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ships include contracts and expectations of financial advantage. These ex-
pectations include those derived from consummated dealings between in-
dividuals and those between an individual and others who may transact
business with that individual in the future. Consequently, injured plaintiffs
may recover for interference with existing and prospective contractual
relationships.
The right to enter into and perform lawful contracts was guaranteed at
common law.'" Accordingly, liability has been found for inducing a party
to break an existing contract and for committing tortious acts rendering con-
tractual performance impossible.'' Moreover, courts have protected the rights
of persons to engage in their chosen livelihood.' 2 Generally, no person may
wrongfully interfere, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct of another's
lawful business, trade, or profession. 3 Individuals have the right to work
or invest capital as they choose and they cannot be compelled to act in a
manner which they regard as contrary to their best interests." Anyone who
tual performance, see Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443, 73 S.W. 800 (1903), and interference
by defendant which forced plaintiff to buy elsewhere at a higher price, thus depriving plaintiff
of expected profit, see Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405
(1908). For a discussion of these historical developments, see Green, pt. 11, supra note 6, at 8-15.
10. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 129, at 915. See generally Note, Intentional Interference with
Business Relations, 3 RUTGERS L. REv. 277 (1949) (tortious interference with contract is based
upon protection of established business relations and contacts which, if combined, become pro-
tectable property rights as distinguished from possessory and title rights).
11. E.g., Blivas and Page, Inc. v. Klein, 5 I11. App. 3d 280, 282 N.E.2d 210 (2d Dist.
1972) (interference with oral contractual relationship between plaintiff and an architectural firm
on a certain housing project held actionable); Krauter v. Adler, 328 Il. App. 127, 65 N.E.2d
215 (1st Dist. 1946) (dissolution of corporation to escape performance of its contract to pay
broker's commission held actionable).
12. See, e.g., Allain v. National R.R. Adjustment Bd., 120 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Il1. 1953)
(plaintiffs, employed as "lounge attendants" by railroad, had the right to be free from unlawful
interference with their employment by persons other than the railroad), aff'd sub nom. Allain
v. Tummon, 212 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1954); Colucci v. Chicago Crime Comm'n, 31 Ill. App.
3d 802, 334 N.E.2d 461 (1st Dist. 1975) (use of allegedly false and defamatory reasons to
not do business with plaintiff was actionable as tort of interference with prospective economic
advantage); City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 11. App. 3d 359, 300 N.E.2d
331 (3d Dist. 1973) (cause of action based on interference with property owner's utilization
of his property found to be adequately stated by recitation of application refusals, misstatements
and threats made by city officials).
13. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lull, 145 F. Supp 134 (N.D. 111. 1956) (court upheld doctor's
claim of intentional interference by medical association which damaged his practice and which
was based on association's reaction to his disapproval of its alleged monopoly of contract
medicine); Colucci v. Chicago Crime Comm'n, 31 111. App. 3d 802, 334 N.E.2d 461 (1st Dist.
1975).
14. See, e.g., Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n, 305 I11. 331, 137 N.E. 222 (1922)
(union carpenter entitled to damages from contractors' association which persuaded dealers
to cease selling materials to union men or those employing union men, thus preventing carpenter's
employment); Purington v. Hinchliff, 219 111. 159, 76 N.E. 47 (1905) (boycott of brick manufac-
turer by bricklayers' union and builders' and brick manufacturers' associations held illegal when
done with intent to injure brick manufacturer's business); Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans
Mill Supply Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 38, 366 N.E.2d 319 (lst Dist. 1972) (manufacturer of paper
products had the right to bypass its jobber and sell to jobber's customer); Bruce v. Ferrara,
107 111. App. 2d 272, 246 N.E.2d 874 (1st Dist. 1969) (in absence of restrictive covenant, unfair
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infringes on any of these rights has committed an actionable wrong." The
rationale underlying this rule is that the law establishes the limits of free
competition. Although competition may be waged aggressively, when a com-
petitor exceeds the reasonable parameters of free competition, thereby caus-
ing loss to another, the law will redress this injury.' The continuum of
competition was not shown by a company which alleged minimal loss and attempted to enjoin
a previous employee from using its customer lists or soliciting its customers). As the Illinois
Supreme Court stated in Carlson:
No persons, individually or by combination, have the right to directly or indirectly
interfere with or disturb another in his lawful business or occupation or for the
sake of compelling him to do some act which in his own judgment his own interest
does not require. Losses willfully caused by another from motives of malice to
one who seeks to exercise and enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enter-
prise, industry, skill or credit will sustain an action.
Carlson v. Carpenters' Contractors' Ass'n, 305 II1. 331, 338, 137 N.E. 222, 224 (1922).
15. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the general principle that:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a con-
tract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing
the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other
for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person
to perform the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977). The Restatement also adopts the principle that:
[O]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective con-
tractual relation . . . is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm
resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists
of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue
the prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing
the prospective relation.
Id. § 766B.
Of course, "[e]very business offering its product or service for sale 'interferes' in some sense
with its competitor's similar offering. Such interference, however, is not the primary intent
but only incidental to the intent to compete; this may be characterized as lawful or permissible
incidental interference ...... CALLMAN, supra note 8, § 9.01, at 5. Relief has been granted
in cases in which "the intruder was chargeable with some anticompetitive conduct, over and
above his mere knowledge of the underlying contract. Whether a plaintiff would be granted
relief against 'tortious' interference by a defendant who committed no such act, and only had
knowledge of the underlying contract, is open to doubt." Id. § 9.01, at 6 (citing Continental
Research, Inc. v. Cruttenden, Podesta & Miller, 222 F. Supp. 190 (D. Minn. 1963)). Continental
Research provides an extensive discussion of the interference tort. The court concludes, "[tlhe
cornerstone of the tort may very well not be the motive with which the person sought to be
charged has acted, but the Minnesota decisions do seem reconcilable on that basis." 222 F.
Supp. at 220.
16. The courts have generously defined "reasonable competition" to include competition
"carried on for the purpose of gain, even to the extent of intending to drive from business
[the competitor] and actually accomplishing that result . . . unless there was actual malice."
Doremus v. Hennessey, 176 Ill. 608, 615, 52 N.E. 924, 926 (1898). See infra notes 53-54 and
accompanying text. See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 31 (1969) (competition is
justified, even if morally questionable, if it is to further one's own interests and is carried
on by lawful means); 86 C.J.S. Torts §§ 43-44 (1954) (lawful competition is not actionable
even though carried to the extent of ruining a rival); Estes, Expanding Horizons in the Law
of Torts-Tortious Interference, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 341 (1974) (privilege of competition, which
may be an affirmative defense, comes from the value placed on free enterprise in America;
however, if an existing contract is disturbed, the defense of competition may not be enough
1983]
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behavior, ranging from ethical competition to unlawful interference, is deter-
mined by the courts according to the prevailing ethical standards of the
community. "
In commercial dealings, the tort of interference consists primarily of two
related but distinct causes of action: interference with contract and in-
terference with prospective advantage. The fundamental distinction between
these two actions lies in the degree of protection each of them affords.' 8
This distinction evolves in part from the different points in time at which
the claims arise: the action for interference with contractual relations pro-
tects contracts that are already in existence, while the action for interference
with prospective advantage protects future contractual dealings.
Much of the confusion surrounding these two causes of action stems from
the various characterizations given to them by the courts. For example, Il-
linois courts have described interference with contract cases as "interference
with business relationships,"' 9 "tortious interference with contractual and
business relationships," 2 0 and "malicious interference with contractual
rights."'" Courts have discussed the action for interference with prospective
advantage in terms of interference with "valuable business relationship[s]," 22
interference with "business interests," 23 "tortious interference with business
to avoid liability).
In the area of sports law, for instance, when a player "jumps" his contract, the player's
original team may seek either injunctive relief or money damages under the interference tort.
The courts have allowed this tort,
only when the interference is found to be 'improper,' a term which represents the
court's conclusion that the third party's actions have surpassed the level of intru-
sion which must be tolerated in order to preserve a healthy level of economic com-
petition for the player's service. It is clear that some degree of infringement must
be accepted by the existing employer. . . . [For example,] the original employer
will not be allowed to prevent his employee-athlete from entering into contracts
to be performed in the future.
J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 4.14, at 399 (1979); see also Missouri v.
National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1317-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980)
(because of its first amendment protections, NOW was not liable for tortious interference for
its boycott of Missouri businesses after the state failed to pass the equal rights amendment).
17. See City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 359, 300 N.E.2d
331 (3d Dist. 1973). The court suggested that a comparison be made of the defendant's alleg-
edly tortious conduct with "the behavior of fair men similarly situated, [and] that the line
of demarcation between permissible behavior and interference reflect[ed] the ethical standards
of the community." Id. at 362-63, 300 N.E.2d at 333 (citing 45 Am. JUR. 2D, Interference
§ 31); accord Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 298 (7th Cir. 1981). See generally
Note, Interference with Contractual Relations: A Property Limitation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1406
(1966) (in determining whether to allow a cause of action for tortious interference with con-
tractual relations, the court should utilize older tort theories, such as misappropriation, in its
analysis).
18. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
19. Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co., 51 IIl. App. 3d 38, 366 N.E.2d
319 (1st Dist. 1977).
20. Thorne v. Elmore, 79 Ill. App. 3d 333, 398 N.E.2d 837 (1st Dist. 1980).
21. Herman v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 41 Ill. 2d 468, 244 N.E.2d 809 (1969).
22. Midway Oil Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 49 F.R.D. 273, 274 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
23. Polytechnic Data Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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relationships," 2 ' and "wrongful invasion of plaintiff's right to establish and
conduct a lawful business." 2 Recent cases have referred to interference with
prospective advantage in terms of "interference with prospective economic
opportunity"2  and "unjustifiable interference with . . . commercial
operations." 27
HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS
The roots of the interference torts can be traced back to Roman law28
and early common law." In the early cases, liability was limited to situa-
tions in which the interference consisted of a separate, independent tort.3 0
For example, when a tortfeasor injured a master's servant, the master could
recover in interference based upon the battery committed to his servant.'
The rationale for this result was that the master had been deprived of the
servant's services due to the battery. Accordingly, the scope of liability did
not expand, because the master's recovery could be no greater than the
recovery of the servant suing on his behalf. The servant was only indirectly
compensated through the recovery of his master."
During the nineteenth century, several cases firmly established the imposi-
tion of liability for tortious interference with contract.33 By recognizing this
24. National Educ. Advertising v. Cass Student Advertising, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D.
I1. 1977).
25. Robinson v. Lull, 145 F. Supp. 134, 138 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
26. DP Services, Inc. v. AM Int'l, 508 F. Supp. 162, 168 (N.D. 111. 1981).
27. Streif v. Bovinette, 88 III. App. 3d 1079, 411 N.E.2d 341 (5th Dist. 1980); see also
Bank Computer Network Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 110 Ill. App. 3d 492, 442 N.E.2d
586 (1st Dist. 1982) (interference with prospective economic advantage).
28. See Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663 (1923) [hereinafter cited
as Sayre]. Professor Sayre stated:
In early Roman law, the paterfamilias, as head of the Roman household of relatives,
dependents, and slaves, was the responsible person who was entitled to bring the
actio iniuriarum for violence committed upon or insults offered to his wife, children,
slaves, or other members of his household; in truth an insult to a member of his
household was only another form of insult to the paterfamilias himself.
Id. at 663; see also Wigmore, Interference with Social Relations, 21 AM. L. REV. 764 (1887)
(discussion of the historical development of tortious interference liability) [hereinafter cited as
Wigmore].
29. See, e.g., Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853) (one of the first
common law interference decisions); see also Sayre, supra note 28, at 663-65; Wigmore, supra
note 28, passim.
30. See Dobbs, Tortious Interference, supra note 2, at 338.
31. See Sayre, supra note 28, at 663-64; Wigmore, supra note 28, at 765 (actions by a
master for injury to his servant existed as early as the reign of Henry Ill (1216-1272)).
32. Dobbs, Tortious Interference, supra note 2, at 339. Early case law was extended par-
tially by decisions which held that a husband could recover if the defendant "beat and in-
jured" his wife. The rationale was similar to that of the master/servant cases, because the
husband had a continuing duty to support his wife, even if her injury interfered with her abil-
ity to provide services. Similarly, just as the master could not replace his injured servant because
of the requirements of the apprenticeship system, "the husband could not go into the market
and obtain a replacement." Id. (citing Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (1620)).
33. See, e.g., Temperton v. Russell, I Q.B. 715 (1893); Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 333 (1881);
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cause of action, the scope of liability, which had been limited previously
to loss resulting from violence to servants, was extended judicially to in-
clude loss resulting from the mere enticement of employees to change jobs."
Consequently, some courts eliminated the requirement that an independent
tortious act support the claim of interference. Although the early cases fre-
quently dealt with interference in commercial settings, similar developments
took place in several noncommercial contexts.3 5
Interference with prospective advantage also was recognized at an early
date; 6 however, this area of law has developed primarily in the twentieth
century." As with the early interference with contract cases, the prospective
advantage decisions were limited at first by the requirement of an independ-
ent tortious act.38 In these decisions, the use or threat of violence had resulted
Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & 1I. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853); see also Carpenter, Interference
with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REv. 728 (1928); Note, Tortious Interference with
Contract: A Reassertion of Society's Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity,
81 COLUM. L. REv. 1491 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tortious Interference]. The rationales
set forth in the early cases for imposing tortious interference liability underlie much of modern
interference law. Id. at 1494.
34. This extension seemed justified by the labor shortage brought on by the severe plague
of the early fourteenth c~ntury. Statutes forbade workers to leave their employment and for-
bade other employers from hiring them. The, tort gradually expanded beyond this statutory
limit, so that it became "a tort to entice a laborer from his hire." Dobbs, Tortious Interference,
supra note 2, at 340 & nn.27-28.
35. Id. at 340-41. For example, actions for "alienation of affections" or "criminal conver-
sation" can be maintained in the absence of a separate tortious act. In other words, the mere
enticement of a wife to leave her husband or commit adultery is actionable.
36. See PROSSER, supra note 2, § 130, at 949 (citing Y.B. 9 Hen. VII 7 (1494); Y.B. 11
Hen. IV 47 (1410)) (discussing the recognition of a writ which created a right of action for
tenants at will who were threatened and, therefore, departed).
37. In the first modern case to find liability for interference with prospective advantages,
a builder sued members of a trade union who had interfered with his present and future con-
tracts to supply building materials to other firms. The court refused to limit the action to
cases of master and servant or personal service and, further, would not distinguish between
claims for inducing persons to break existing contracts and claims for inducing persons not
to enter into contracts. In so holding, the court stated:
There was the same wrongful intent in both cases, wrongful because malicious.
There was the same kind of injury to the plaintiff. It seems rather a fine distinc-
tion to say that, where a defendant maliciously induces a person not to carry out
a contract already made with the plaintiff and so injures the plaintiff, it is ac-
tionable, but where he injures the plaintiff by maliciously preventing a person from
entering into a contract with the plaintiff, which he would otherwise have entered
into, it is not actionable.
Temperton v. Russell, I Q.B. 715, 728 (1893).
38. See Wigmore, The Boycott and Kindred Practices as Ground for Damages, 21 AM.
L. REv. 509 (1887). Wigmore distinguished between interference with customers through acts
of persuasion not fraudulent or slanderous (not actionable) and acts of fraud, slander, violence
or nuisance (actionable). Id. at 514-15. The distinction protects those involved in ordinary com-
merce, because "coercion . . . is one of the every-day instruments of commercial dealings.
. . . It is not the fact of a coercion that is important, but the nature of its cause." Id. at
526-27 (emphasis in original). To permit liability based on a "coercive" act, but not on a
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in an interference with the plaintiff's business.39 Later cases were of a similar
nature, such as one in which a defendant had used improper means to distract
prospective employees or customers."0 As in the contract cases, the courts
also allowed recovery for the loss of a prospective advantage when a person
wrongfully interfered with the plaintiff's profession." Hence, the develop-
ment of the interference torts generally was parallel, 2 and liability gradually
expanded under both theories to include situations outside the commercial
context. Several distinct doctrines emerged from this development, including
commercial disparagement, alienation of affection, and criminal
conversation. 3
"persuasive" one, would allow too much discretion to the jury when the difference between
the actions is only relative. "[F]rom one point of view all persuasion may be regarded as coer-
cion, while from another all coercion may be regarded as persuasion." Id. at 528. Liability
based on threats of unlawful acts, on the other hand, provides a "clear and definite" distinc-
tion, "easily apprehended, and . . . fair not only as among all classes of defendants, but
also-which is equally important-as between their liberties and the plaintiff's rights." Id. at
529; see also Wigmore, supra note 28.
39. See Carrington v. Taylor, 11 East 571, 103 Eng. Rep. 1126, 1127 (1809). In Carrington,
the plaintiff made a living from the sale of wild fowl attracted to his decoy. Another hunt-
ers shooting of game near the decoy was held to be actionable as a "wilful disturbance."
In refusing to set aside the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the court relied on Keble
v. Hickringill, 11 Mod. 74, 88 Eng. Rep. 898 (1706). Carrington, 103 Eng. Rep. at 1127 n.(a).
40. See, e.g., Tarleton v. McGawley, Peake 270, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (1793); Garret v. Taylor,
Cro. Jac. 567, 79 Eng. Rep. 485 (1621).
41. See, e.g., Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q.B. 715 (1893) (union held liable after inducing
suppliers of building materials to breach existing contracts with plaintiff and to not enter into
further contracts with him); Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick, 134 Eng. Rep. 866 (1843) (defend-
ant who caused actor to be hissed off the stage held liable for interfering with his employ-
ment); see also Basak, Principles of Liability for Interference with Trade, Profession or Call-
ing, 27 LAW Q. REv. 290, 312 (1911) (difficulty in analyzing interference with profession "may
be solved by the recognition of freedom of mind and action as a legal right and its application
to cases of interference with trade").
42. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 130, at 949-50. As economic life became more complex, the
courts recognized the need to protect individuals' reasonable expectations from wrongful in-
terference. One court stated, "the notion is intolerable that a man should be protected by
the law in the enjoyment of property once it is acquired, but left unprotected by the law in
his effort to acquire it." Brennan v. United Hatters of N. Am., 73 N.J.L. 729, 742, 65 A.
165, 171 (1906). Most of the expectancies protected by the courts were those based on the
likelihood of obtaining employment, Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 74 A. 595 (1909); or
of securing employees, Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 7:59, 53 A. 230 (1902);
or of obtaining customers, Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). Courts, familiar
with ascertainment of damages in breach of contract cases, could use this experience to deter-
mine a plaintiff's loss due to interference with a prospective contract. They were less likely
to find liability (and damages) for interference with noncontractual relations, e.g., expulsion
from a voluntary fraternal organization, Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d
30 (1956); or for deprivation of the chance to win a contest, Collatz v. Fox Wis. Amusement
Corp., 239 Wis. 156, 300 N.W. 162 (1941). In these latter types of actions plaintiffs frequently
lost because the courts thought it was too uncertain that the benefits would have accrued to
the plaintiff. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 129, at 950.
43. See generally Dobbs, Tortious Interference, supra note 2, at 341-42.
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MODERN APPROACHES
Today, tortious interference with contract is a recognized cause of action
in all American jurisdictions.44 The tort of interference with prospective ad-
vantage, however, receives mixed reviews. There are two widely divergent
views on this subject: the "property limitation" or "New York approach,"
and the "California approach." 45 Most jurisdictions, including Illinois, have
adopted a view which falls somewhere between these two extremes.
By analogizing to the tort of trespass, the New York courts traditionally
characterized the tort of interference as an obstruction of the property rights
of the plaintiff. 6 As a result, the plaintiff's recovery had to be grounded
on a property right, such as an existing contract. New York courts have
continued to apply this early analysis. Consequently, under the New York
approach, claims of interference with economic expectancies or prospective
advantages are denied because these are not viewed as protectable property
rights.4"
In contrast, the California courts traditionally did not view an action for
the tort of interference as a means of safeguarding property rights.48 Rather,
these courts focused on the protection of certain relational interests. As a
result, California recognizes a prospective advantage as a protectable interest.
In fact, California recently has gone so far as to recognize a cause of action
for negligent interference with prospective advantage, thereby becoming the
first American jurisdiction to do so.4
44. See generally PROSSER, supra note 2, § 130 (despite some courts' reluctance to accept
the doctrine of tortious interference with contract in its early days, the tort is now recognized
everywhere and applies to any contract, regardless of its nature).
45. See generally Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 33 (discussing New York and Califor-
nia approaches, and suggesting limitations on tortious interference liability).
46. Id. at 1501-04.
47. See Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 406 N.E.2d 445,
428 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1980). The New York Court of Appeals relied on Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 766 (1979), and found enforceable contracts protected against any kind of inten-
tional interference, but prospective contracts protected only from violent, fraudulent or other
wrongful interference. Thus, "[wlithout legally enforceable contract rights a plaintiff (in New
York] has no possible action against an interferer using non-tortious means." Note, Tortious
Interference, supra note 33, at 1504 n.95.
48. See Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827, 537 P.2d 865, 872, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745,
752 (1975) (all advantageous relations are protected, whether or not they have "attained the
dignity of a legally enforceable agreement"). One commentator has pointed out that Califor-
nia's view of the kind of interests which deserve tort protection has expanded over the past
40 years. Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 33, at 1505 & nn.98-100. In 1941, Judge
Traynor wrote that "[clompetitive freedom . . . is of sufficient importance to justify one com-
petitor in inducing a third party to forsake another competitor if no contractual relationship
exists between the two." Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 36, 112 P.2d 631, 633
(1941) (dictum). In 1975, a California court protected all existing or future advantageous rela-
tions. Buckaloo, 14 Cal. 3d at 815, 537 P.2d at 865, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 745. Most recently,
a California court protected all areas of foreseeable harm from interference. J'Aire Corp. v.
Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
49. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d at 808, 598 P.2d at 66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
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The Illinois approach to the interference torts falls somewhere between
the restrictive New York approach and the liberal California approach. Unlike
New York, Illinois recognizes both intentional interference with contract or
contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective advantage."
Illinois courts also have recognized a cause of action for negligent interference
with contract," but have been unwilling to follow the California courts in
recognizing a cause of action for negligent interference with prospective
advantage.52
412 (contractor held to have "duty of care to tenant of a building undergoing construction
work to prosecute that work in a manner which does not cause undue injury to the tenant's
business where such injury is reasonably foreseeable").
50. See, e.g., Blockman v. Sandalwood Apartments, 613 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1980); Republic Gear
Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 406 F.2d 57 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1000 (1969); Swager
v. Couri, 77 Ill. 3d 173, 395 N.E.2d 921 (1979); Ramsey v. Greenwald, 91 111. App. 3d 855,
414 N.E.2d 1266 (2d Dist. 1980); Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank v. State Farm Ins. Co., 83 Ill.
App. 3d 507, 404 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1980); Bolger v. Danley Lumber, Inc., 77 Il1. App.
3d 297, 395 N.E.2d 1066 (1st Dist. 1979); O'Fallon Dev. Co. v. City of O'Fallon, 43 IlI. App.
3d 348, 356 N.E.2d 1293 (5th Dist. 1976); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Darien,
43 Ill. App. 3d 400, 357 N.E.2d 211 (2d Dist. 1976); Farley v. Kissel Co., 18 Il. App. 3d
139, 310 N.E.2d 385 (1st Dist. 1974); Bergfield v. Stork, 7 Ill. App. 3d 486, 288 N.E.2d 15
(5th Dist. 1972); Blivas & Page, Inc. v. Klein, 5 111. App. 3d 280, 282 N.E.2d 210 (2d Dist.
1972); Worrick v. Flora, 133 Ill. App. 2d 755, 372 N.E.2d 708 (3d Dist. 1971).
Some Illinois courts apply a property limitation approach. See, e.g., Carlson v. Carpenter
Contractors' Ass'n, 305 II1. 331, 338, 137 N.E. 222, 224 (1922) (plaintiffs entitled to protection
from willful interference with their rights "to exercise and enjoy 'the fruits and advantages
of [their] own industry, skill or credit"); Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 II. App. 3d
547, 552, 413 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1st Dist. 1980) ("plaintiff must have a reasonable expectancy
of entering a'valid business relationship, and defendant must purposely interfere and defeat
this legitimate expectancy, thereby causing harm to the plaintiff"); Parkway Bank & Trust
Co. v. City of Darien, 43 II. App. 3d 400, 402-03, 357 N.E.2d 211, 213-14 (2d Dist. 1976)
(although an action for interference with prospective business advantage does not require the
existence of an enforceable contract, plaintiff's complaint, which failed to allege any business
relations with third parties, was insufficient to maintain an action for tortious interference following
defendant's rezoning of tract of land plaintiff intended to develop); Krauteer v.0 Adler, 328
Ill. App. 127, 65 N.E.2d 215 (1st Dist. 1946) (abstract opinion) (plaintiff had property right
in contract for broker's fees with corporation and could recover for injury sustained as result
of dissolution).
51. See American Transp. Co. v. U.S. Sanitary Specialties Corp., 2 Ill. App. 2d 144, 118
N.E.2d 793 (1st Dist. 1954). The court reasoned that, if one could be held liable for negligent
interference with property interests, there was no reason to disallow liability for negligent in-
terference with "'contract interests [which] have often been treated as property."' Id. at 152-53,
118 N.E.2d at 797 (quoting with approval Carpenter, Elements of the Tort of Interference
with Contractual Relations, 41 HARV. L. REv. 728, 732 (1928)).
52. See O'Brien v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 82 111. App. 3d 833, 401 N.E.2d 1356
(4th Dist. 1980). Justice Craven stated that, in not recognizing such a cause of action, Illinois
was among "the majority of jurisdictions." Id. at 85, 401 N.E.2d at 1357; see, e.g., Ethyl
Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (plaintiff did not prove
direct interference by defendant, who was held not liable for either negligent or consequential
interference). But see, e.g., Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case
for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REV. 664 (1964) (recovery for negligent interference with contractual
and prospective business advantage should be allowed if the elements of negligence are proven
satisfactorily and if recovery is indicated by balancing the interests in favor of recovery).
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THE ILLINOIS APPROACH
A. Elements of the Tort
Illinois first recognized intentional interference with contract and inten-
tional interference with prospective advantage in 1895, in Doremus v.
Hennessey. 3 Modern definitions of the interference torts by Illinois courts
closely parallel the standards established in Doremus.14 The traditional
elements of interference with contract are: (1) the existence of a contract
between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of
the contract; (3) an intentional unjustified inducement to breach the con-
tract; (4) a subsequent breach by the third party; and (5) damage to the
plaintiff as a result of the breach." The essential elements of tortious in-
terference with prospective advantage are: (1)'the plaintiff's reasonable ex-
pectancy of entering into a valid business relationship; (2) the defendant's
knowledge of the expectancy; (3) an intentional interference by the defend-
53. 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898). In Doremus, the defendants were held liable for $6,000
in damages to a laundry owner's business. The laundry owner had refused to increase her prices
to those charged by the Chicago Laundrymen's Association, whereupon defendants, through
use of "intimidation . . . and unlawful inducements," id. at 612, 52 N.E. at 925, caused breaches
of contract and induced others not to take her work. The court held this interference an ac-
tionable wrong, not lawful competition, because the defendants acted with "intent to do a wrongful
harm and injury," i.e., with malice. Id. at 615, 52 N.E. at 926. The Illinois Supreme Court
found this holding to be supported by English and American precedents, id. at 615-16, 52 N.E.
at 926, stating:
Every man has a right, under the law, as between himself and others, to full freedom
in disposing of his own labor and capital according to his own will, and any one
who invades that right without lawful cause or justification commits a legal wrong;
and, if followed by an injury caused in consequence thereof, the one whose right
is thus invaded has a legal ground of action for such wrong.
Id. at 615, 52 N.E. at 926.
54. See Schott v. Glover, 109 Il1. App. 3d 230, 236, 440 N.E.2d 376, 380 (1st Dist. 1982).
In Schott, the court stated that business expectancy has "less protection than the right to receive
the benefits of a contract." Thus, defendant's conditional privilege as codefendant's attorney
was held to be "even more likely to be privileged where no contract is involved," and plain-
tiff's complaint which failed "to allege facts which would constitute actual malice" did not
"state a cause of action for tortious interference with a business expectancy." Id. As stated
by the appellate court in Blivas & Page:
[Tlhe theory of the action as announced in Lumley v. Gye [2 El. & BI. 216, 118
Eng. Rep. 749 (1853)] has been repeatedly reaffirmed in this State and is in conform-
ity with Section 766 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts. In this Court's opin-
ion an intentional knowing act committed by a third party without justification
or excuse causing the breach of a contract constitutes an actionable tort.
5 111. App. 3d 280, 285, 282 N.E. 2d 210, 214 (2d Dist. 1972) (citing Herman v. Prudence Mut.
Casualty, 41 III. 2d 468, 244 N.E.2d 809 (1969)).
55. See Hannigan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 410 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 902 (1969); Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 38,
47, 366 N.E.2d 319, 326 (1st Dist. 1977). See generally Developments in the Law-Competitive
Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 959-69 (1964) (to establish a cause of action for tortious in-
terference with contractual relations, the plaintiff must show the defendant's knowledge and
intent, improper affirmative conduct by defendant, and resulting damage).
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ant; (4) a failure of the expectancy to become a valid business relationship;
and (5) damages to the plaintiff.5 6
Due to the similarities between the interference torts, some Illinois deci-
sions have set forth a common definition of the two actions, treating them
as one. The elements of this hybrid interference action are: (1) the existence
of a valid business relationship or expectancy; (2) knowledge of the rela-
tionship or expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3-) an intentional
interference; 7 (4) the inducement or causing of a breach or termination of
the relationship or expectancy; and (5) resultant damage to the party whose
relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. 8
56. See Schott v. Glover, 109 I1. App. 3d 230, 235, 440 N.E.2d 376, 380 (1st Dist. 1982);
Tru-Link Fence Co. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 104 Il1. App. 3d 745, 751, 432 N.E.2d
1188, 1193 (1st Dist. 1982).
57. Some formulations of the interference torts require intentional and malicious interference
as a necessary element. See, e.g., Midway Oil Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 49 F.R.D. 273,
(N.D. Il1. 1970). Gulf Oil Corporation allegedly provided Midway's customers and dealers with
false information on product distribution and credit. In refusing to grant Gulf's motion for
summary judgment, the court held that the element of malice was essential to the cause of
action, and defined malice as the knowing commitment of an intentional act which unjustifiably
violates the plaintiff's rights. Id. at 274. Summary judgment was inappropriate because the
existence of malice was a material issue of fact for trial. In another case, a manufacturer sued
to collect payment for goods sold to its distributor. The distributor counterclaimed for tortious
interference with business relations based on the manufacturer's sale directly to the distributor's
customers. The court held that the distributor failed to demonstrate that the manufacturer acted
with malice, and defined malice as "not used in its popular sense of ill will or hatred, but
in its legal sense as an intent to do wrongful harm and injury and without just cause." Can-
dalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co., 51 111. App. 3d 38, 48, 366 N.E.2d 319, 326
(1st Dist. 1977).
Because interference is a purposely caused tort, however, the element of intent must always
be alleged and proved in order to maintain successfully a cause of action. See, e.g., Republic
Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 406 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1000 (1969)
(under Illinois law, malice, meaning ill will toward plaintiff, is not essential to maintain a
cause of action; however, it is necessary to allege that the defendant intended to induce the
breach of contract); Clifton-Strode, No. 2, Inc. v. Kent, 110 Il. App. 3d '525, 529, 442 N.E.2d
668, 669 (3d Dist. 1982) (malice will not be inferred when there is no evidence of an intentional
wrong); Tru-Link Fence Co. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 104 Il. App. 3d 745, 432 N.E.2d
1188 (1st Dist. 1982) (court dismissed action because plaintiff failed to allege defendants'
knowledge of plaintiff's business expectancy, or intentional action by defendants to interfere);
O'Fallon Dev. Co. v. City of O'Fallon, 43 Ill. App. 3d 348, 358, 356 N.E.2d 1293,.1301 (5th
Dist. 1976) (plaintiff failed to state cause of action for tortious interference with prospective
business advantage for defendant's purchase and operation of a water tower with commercial
logo of plaintiff's competitor because the complaint did not allege defendant's knowledge of
plaintiff's business expectations); Farley v. Kissel Co., 18 Ill. App. 3d 139, 147-48, 310 N.E.2d
385, 390 (1st Dist. 1974) (financial institution was not liable for lending funds to seller for
land development, when seller was under contract to sell the land to plaintiff and subsequently
revoked that contract, because defendant's conduct was unintentional, even though it might
have caused the breach of contract); accord Blivas & Page, Inc. v. Klein, 5 Ill. App. 3d 280,
282 N.E.2d 210 (2d Dist. 1972); Bergfield v. Stork, 7 Ill. App. 3d 486, 288 N.E.2d 15 (5th
Dist. 1972). Accordingly, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to indicate that the defen-
dant's purpose was the alleged interference.
58. See City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 359, 300 N.E.2d
331 (3d Dist. 1973); Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet,
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Generally, Illinois courts have required that there be an existing contract
or prospective business relationship before a cause of action will lie.5 9 The
fact that the contract is terminable at will, however, does not bar recovery
because courts often treat such contracts as subsisting relations until
terminated. 0 . Consequently, contracts that are terminable at will are presumed
to remain in effect and, thus, are entitled to protection."' Defendants have
been required to have knowledge of the existence of the contract or pro-
spective business relationship and to have proximately caused the plaintiff's
injuries."2 Where the defendant intentionally or foreseeably causes an in-
terference, the court will find his or her acts to be the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries. 3
Inc., 16 Ill. App. 3d 709, 306 N.E.2d 549 (1st Dist. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 61
111. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975). In City of Rock Falls, the court stated that one measure
of damage is loss of possible income, and that protection from unjustified interference with
business relations extends beyond contract liability. 13 II1. App. 3d at 363, 300 N.E.2d at 333
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 comment c, at 9 (1979)).
59. See, e.g., J.E.L. Realtors, Inc. v. Mettile, 111 Ill. App. 3d 987, 444 N.E.2d 750 (3d
Dist. 1982) (contract provision which transferred liquor license from defendant to plaintiff in
the event defendant ceased to operate a tavern on plaintiff's premises did not violate public
policy since the municipality's code allowed such transfers; therefore, the contract was valid
and plaintiff could maintain a cause of action for tortious interference against other defend-
ants); Loewenthal Sec. Co. v. White Paving Co., 351 111. 285, 298-99, 184 N.E. 310, 315 (1932)
(contract between plaintiff and paving company did not include expectation that company would
bid on sewer job; thus, construction company's bid for that job held not to interfere with
an existing contractual relation).
60. See, e.g., Kemper v. Worcester, 106 II1. App. 3d 121, 435 N.E.2d 827 (5th Dist. 1982)
(court must focus on the defendant's interference with the contractual relationship, not on
whether the employment agreement is enforceable between the plaintiff and his employer); W.P.
Iverson & Co. v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 18 111. App. 2d 404, 152 N.E.2d 615 (1st Dist. 1958)
(interference action exists even though one party could terminate contract under certain condi-
tions). But cf. Ancraft Prod. Co. v. Universal Oil Co., 84 111. App. 3d 836, 844, 405 N.E.2d
1162, 1168 (1st Dist. 1980) ("In the absence of an express contract of employment and without
malice [by the defendants], principles of free competition prevent liability to a subsequent
employer."). See generally PROSSER, supra note 2, § 129, at 932-33.
61. See, e.g., Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 110 I1. App. 3d 522, 530, 444 N.E.2d
579, 584 (1st Dist. 1982) (court applied to a terminable at will contract the standards estab-
lished for tortious interference with contractual relations, holding that to distinguish between
conduct which directly effectuates a breach, and unjustifiable coercive conduct which causes
the same result without a breach, would diminish the significance of the tort, leaving few legal
restraints on competitors) (citing Hannigan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 410 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902 (1969)). In W.P. Iverson & Co. v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 18 Ill. App.
2d 404, 152 N.E.2d 615 (1st Dist. 1958), the court stated that "maliciously causing a breach
of contract terminable at will is actionable. . . . [The] gist of the action is the malicious in-
terference in the contractual relationship." Id. at 417, 152 N.E.2d at 621.
62. See Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 I11. App. 3d 547, 413 N.E.2d 98 (1st Dist.
1980); Farley v. Kissell Co., 18 111. App. 3d 139, 310 N.E.2d 385 (1st Dist. 1974); Northern
Ins. Co. v. Doctor, 23 111. App. 2d 225, 161 N.E.2d 867 (lst Dist. 1959).
63. The key concept in this finding is the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just
cause. For cases holding this to be willful and malicious interference with a contractual rela-
tionship, see Meadowmoor Dairies v. Drivers' Union, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E.2d 308 (1939), aff'd,
312 U.S. 287 (1941); Doremus v. Hennessey, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898); W.P. Iverson
& Co. v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 18 111. App. 2d 404, 152 N.E.2d 615 (lst Dist. 1958). It is impor-
tant to distinguish between lawful and unlawful actions. Competition is lawful, even if it results
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Although a cause of action for interference will lie for mere wrongful
persuasion," interference often is carried out by means of a wrongful act
which in itself constitutes an independent tort."' For instance, interference
may be effected by means of defamatory statements 6" or threats of violence. 7
In addition, an interference claim may lie when the defendant informs the
plaintiff's employer of a debt, 8 or when the defendant's conduct constitutes
a nuisance. 9 A claim for interference also may lie where a defendant in-
terferes with the plaintiff's business by means of duress, which may be car-
ried out through severe coercion or refusal to deal with the plaintiff.7"
in loss of property or personal service. Acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or intimidation resulting
in loss are unlawful, particularly if undertaken for malicious motives. Doremus, 176 Ill. at 615,
52 N.E. at 926.
64. As used in interference cases, wrongful persuasion refers to enticement that is unlawful
due to the absence of justification on the part of the interferor. See supra notes 30-34 and
accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Colucci v. Chicago Crime Comm'n, 31 Il1. App. 3d 802, 334 N.E.2d 461
(1st Dist. 1975) (interference consisted of alleged defamatory statement which gave rise to separate
causes of action for libel and for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage);
City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 359, 300 N.E.2d 331 (3d
Dist. 1973) (city officials' refusals of building permit applications actionable for tortious in-
terference and also actionable as misuse of public offices).
66. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Greenwald, 91 111. App. 3d 855, 863, 414 N.E.2d 1266, 1272 (2d
Dist. 1980) (defendant is liable for tortious interference with contract, since his malicious defama-
tion of fellow-employee was held to be unjustifiable conduct outside the scope of qualified
privilege to act within his employer's best interests); Colucci v. Chicago Crime Comm'n, 31
Ill. App. 3d 802, 334 N.E.2d 461 (1st Dist. 1975) (cause of action for interference with pros-
pective advantage not precluded because interference also was actionable as libel or slander);
Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Il. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1st Dist. 1949) (the publication
of a falsehood which damaged a renowned portrait painter's reputation and interfered with
the property value of his work and his potential income was actionable under defamation law
without a showing of special damages). In holding that the defamation publication also was
actionable as a tortious interference with the plaintiff's livelihood, the Pendleton court stated
that "'[elvery man has a right, under the law . . . to full freedom in disposing of his own
labor or capital . . . , and anyone who invades that right without lawful cause or justification
commits a legal wrong .... .' " Id. at 195, 89 N.E.2d at 438 (quoting Doremus v. Hennessey,
176 11. 608, 615, 52 N.E. 924, 926 (1898)).
67. See, e.g., Beaton v. Tarrant, 102 Ill. App. 124 (1st Dist. 1902). In Beaton, striking
union workers picketed their former employer's business. The strikers allegedly called the new
employees "scabs and vile names" and threatened them with bodily injury. Id. at 126. The
court concluded that this action constituted abusive picketing "calculated to intimidate a
reasonable and prudent man," and issued an injunction to restrain this conduct. Id. at 129.
68. See, e.g., Ammons v. Jet Credit Sales, Inc., 34 Il1. App. 2d 456, 181 N.E.2d 601 (1st
Dist. 1962). In Ammons, a garnishment demand was served upon the plaintiff and her employer
prior to entry of judgment against the plaintiff, who claimed that she was not indebted to
the defendant sales company because the signature on the contract was a forgery. The plaintiff
claimed malicious impairment of her credit and sought punitive and compensatory damages.
The court recognized a cause of action, but disallowed the claim because the garnishment de-
mand served on the plaintiff was void. Id. at 463-64, 181 N.E.2d at 604.
69. See, e.g., Streif v. Bovinette, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 411 N.E.2d 341 (5th Dist. 1980)
(repeated acts of harassment constituted nuisance and an interference with plaintiff's business).
70. See Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REV. 237 (1942); Dawson, Economic
Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947). See generally DOBBS, HAND-
BOOK, supra note 3, § 10.2, at 653.
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B. Remedies
Interference actions often provide successful plaintiffs with remedies which
traditionally have been reserved to either tort or contract actions. 1 Com-
pensatory damages are limited only by the tort element of proximate cause. 2
Damages in contract cases usually have been limited by the rule that only
damages within the contemplation of the parties are recoverable. 3 In Illinois,
the general rule is that although punitive damages are not recoverable in
contract actions,"' they are recoverable in tort in the most compelling
instances.75
In deciding interference cases, however, courts often have paid little at-
tention to the distinctions between tort and contract remedies, ignoring the
remedial limits imposed by these concepts. Consequently, plaintiffs in in-
terference actions have been able to recover for consequential damages, loss
of profits and punitive damages." Punitive damages also have been awarded
in tortious interference cases when the breach was effected by means of an
independent, intentional tort." Thus, when pleading a case involving an in-
ducement to breach a contract, the practitioner should state, in separate
71. Remedies for breach of contract typically seek to give the plaintiff either the benefit
of the bargain, or his expectation interest. Thus, a promisee may be able to recover the benefit
of his contract as if it had not been breached. Alternatively, tort remedies attempt to compen-
sate the plaintiff for his injuries or losses. The function of tort remedies is to return the plain-
tiff to his previous position, as if the tort had not been committed. See generally DoBBs, HAND-
BOOK, SUpra note 3, § 8, at 540.
72. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 129, at 948.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Alsip Homebuilders, Inc. v. Shusta, 6 II1. App. 3d 65, 284 N.E.2d 509 (1st
Dist. 1972). The Alsip court offered the following rationale for the general rule against allowing
punitive damages in contract cases:
If the general purpose underlying the law of damages is to promote security and
prevent disorder . . . and breaches of contract do not cause as much resentment
or other physical or mental discomfort as do wrongs called torts or crimes, then
the remedies needed to prevent breaches of contract and satisfy the injured party
are not as severe as those needed to punish the tortfeasor or criminal.
Id. at 69, 284 N.E.2d at 512.
75. In Illinois, "[plunitive damages are recoverable [in tort] only where a wrongful act is
accompanied by aggravating circumstances such as willfullness, wantonness, malice or oppres-
sion." Glass v. Burkett, 64 111. App. 3d 676, 683, 381 N.E.2d 821, 826 (5th Dist. 1978); accord
Smith v. Dunaway, 77 111. App. 2d 1, 5, 221 N.E.2d 665, 667 (5th Dist. 1966); City of Chicago
v. Shayne, 46 111. App. 2d 33, 38, 196 N.E.2d 521, 524 (1st Dist. 1964).
76. See, e.g., Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 110 I11. App. 3d 522, 534-35, 444
N.E.2d 579, 587-88 (lst Dist. 1982); Doremus v. Hennessey, 176 I11. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898).
77. See, e.g., Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care, 29 111. App. 3d 339, 330
N.E.2d 540 (5th Dist. 1975). In Ledingham, the defendant denied the plaintiff medical benefits
under a health care plan. The court recognized that "[plunitive damages may properly be
awarded" in a tortious interference action. Id. at 351, 330 N.E.2d at 549. The court, however,
refused to award punitive damages because it found that the denial of benefits was made in
good faith. Id. at 352, 330 N.E.2d at 549; cf. Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 110
Ill. App. 3d 522, 534-36, 444 N.E.2d 579, 587-88 (1st Dist. 1982) (punitive damages justified
because of defendant's intentional coercion and oppression).
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counts, the breach of contract action, claiming compensatory damages, and
the interference action, claiming both compensatory and punitive damages.
This procedure will discourage the court from viewing the action as primar-
ily a breach of contract case, which would all but preclude recovery of
punitive damages."
C. Limitations
Traditionally, the protection afforded existing contractual rights has been
significantly greater than that afforded prospective rights." A party to an
existing contract has a definite and enforceable expectation of receiving the
benefits of the contract, while a person with a prospective business relation-
ship has a mere expectancy of future economic gain." Courts have persistently
refused to accord prospective relations the same dignity as contractually
cemented relations.' The right to engage in business relationships must be
exercised with reasonable regard for others' interests; however, interference
in good faith or in pursuit of a bona fide claim of right :is not actionable
in the absence of either malice or the employment of improper means.8
78. See generally Teeple, When If Ever Are Punitive Damages Recoverable In An Illinois
Contract Action?, 65 ILL. B.J. 152, 153 (1976). In cases where legal remedies prove inadequate,
Illinois courts will not hesitate to enjoin the actions of defendants which constitute interference.
Cf. Illinois Power Co. v. Latham, 15 Il1. App. 3d 156, 160, 303 N.E.2d 448, 452 (5th Dist.
1973) (injunction did not violate union members' constitutional rights, since demonstrations
by union were "anything but peaceful.... [and t]he courts of this state and the United States
Supreme Court have consistently held that mass picketing and violence, obstruction of ingress
and egress, threats, intimidation and coercion may be enjoined"); Beaton v. Tarrant, 102 I1.
App. 124 (1st Dist. 1902) (striking workers have right to picket, but may not intimidate fellow
workers who continue to work).
Injunctions also have been issued to end secondary boycotts which have interfered with the
plaintiff's business by denying access to customers or suppliers. See, e.g., 2063 Lawrence Ave.
Bldg. Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37, 35 N.E.2d 373 (1941); Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union, 313 111. App. 24, 38 N.E.2d 972 (1st Dist. 1942). For additional ex-
amples of injunctive relief awarded in tortious interference actions, see supra note 16.
79. See Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 413 N.E.2d 98 (1980), where
the court declared: "The sacrosanct contractual relation takes precedence over the conflicting
rights of any presumptive interferor, including his right to compete and his own prospective
advantage." Id. at 552, 413 N.E.2d at 101 (citing PROSSER, supra note 2, at § 129). However,
"the right to engage in a business relationship is not absolute, and must be exercised with
regard to the rights of others. The rights of others most commonly take the form of lawful
competition, which constitutes a privileged interference with another's business." Id. at 552,
413 N.E.2d at 102.
80. See, e.g., Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 IlI. App. 3d 547, 413 N.E.2d 98 (1st
Dist. 1980). The Belden court distinguished between the "mere expectancy of future economic
gain" in a prospective business relationship and the "certain and enforceable expectation of
receiving the benefits of the contract." Id. at 552, 413 N.E.2d at 102.
81. The Belden court stated that "[a]s the degree of the enforceability of the business rela-
tionship decreases, the extent of permissible interference by an outsider increases." Id. at 552,
413 N.E.2d at 102.
82. Id.; see also Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank v. State Farm Ins. Co., 83 Ill. App. 3d 507,
514, 404 N.E.2d 426, 431 (1st Dist. 1980) (issue of improper interference with competitor prop-
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This rule is justified by a policy favoring free and lawful competition.83
Competitive interference with another's economic expectancies will not be
actionable, even if it results in lost profits or complete ruin.8 ' If the com-
petition is carried on with improper motives or ill will, however, and not
in the furtherance of the interests of the competitor, or if unlawful means
are employed, such competition will not be "privileged." 8
Where the acts causing interference with contract or prospective advan-
tage constitute independent torts in themselves, "privileges" applicable to
those torts also may render the interference nonactionable."s Once a court
has determined that the alleged interference was "privileged" and lawful,
the existence of malice or improper motive on the part of the defendant
will be irrelevant.
8 7
erly raised in plaintiff's allegation that defendant used such unfair means as "slander of credit
and the use of confidential information").
83. See PROSSER, supra note 2, § 130, at 954-55. Section 768 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts sets forth the competitor's "privilege." According to § 768, one legitimately may
cause a third person not to enter into or continue a business relation with a competitor of
the actor if:
(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor
and the other and (b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and (c) his action
does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and (d) his purpose is
at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1979).
84. The "pursuit of legitimate business goals" is privileged and one who holds merely a
prospective advantage may not avoid such competition through protection of this tort. Belden
Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 553, 413 N.E.2d 98, 103 (1st Dist. 1980). In
Belden, the defendant made a takeover bid, conditioned upon rejection by shareholders of
a previously announced merger between Belden and another company. Belden Corporation
charged that the defendant tortiously interfered with the anticipated benefits from the pro-
posed merger. The court dismissed the cause of action for interference with prospective advan-
tage because Belden failed to provide proof of unfair competition. Id.; see also Doremus v.
Hennessey, 176 11. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898).
85. The unfair competition required by the Belden court, in order to support a successful
prospective advantage action, "includes fraud, intimidation, or disparagement," and this
disparagement must be deliberate, evidencing "malevolent intent." Belden, 90 I11. App. 3d at
553-54, 413 N.E.2d at 103; see also Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank v. State Farm Ins. Co., 83
I11. App. 3d 507, 404 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1980); Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill
Supply Co., 51 111. App. 3d 38, 366 N.E.2d 319 (1st Dist. 1977). The Candalaus court held
that a party may exploit the market to further his own business, but his conduct will not
be privileged if motivated only by ill will or spite. Id. at 48, 366 N.E.2d at 327. Since it was
customary in the paper products industry "for a manufacturer to sell to a distributor-customer
of its own distributor-customers," the court held that the manufacturer's competition with its
distributor-customer was not "made solely out of spite or ill will" and therefore was not ac-
tionable. Id. at 49, 366 N.E.2d at 327.
86. See, e.g., American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Ass'n, 106 I11. App.
3d 626, 634, 435 N.E.2d 1297, 1302 (1st Dist. 1982) (in an action in which both defamation
and tortious interference were alleged, the "conditional privilege" which applied to the defama-
tion count was held to be equally applicable to the interference count); see also Gasbarro v.
Lever Bros. Co., 490 F.2d 424, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1973) (conditional privilege applied to interference
with prospective advantage claim as well as to defamation claim).
87, See, e.g., Bank Computer Network Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 110 111. App.
3d 492, 500, 442 N.E.2d 586, 592-93 (1st Dist. 1982) (Continental's offset of defendant's checking
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Furthermore, while the right to establish business relationships and the
right to enter into contracts are common and reciprocal, they are not ab-
solute. Even interference with existing contracts may be justified in certain
situations, such as where the defendant is exercising an equal or superior
right. 8 Interference also may be justified in those unusual instances in which
the defendant acts to protect an interest deemed to have greater social util-
ity than that of insuring the stability of contract, such as when contractual
performance would prove to be injurious to public health, safety or welfare.89
REPRESENTATIVE "EMPLOYMENT" DECISIONS
Causes of action for interference with contract and prospective advantage
frequently arise out of two common commercial settings: the employer-
employee relationship and the businessman's relationship with his customers
or clients. Claims arising out of employment relationships generally can be
classified under three categories: (1) when the employee sues the employer
for termination of employment; (2) when the employer sues a third party
account and dishonor of several of its checks was found to be taken "to protect its own pres-
ent, existing economic interest" and, thus, was privileged); cf. Petit v. Cuneo, 290 Ill. App.
16, 7 N.E.2d 774 (1st Dist. 1937) (large stockholder of corporation was privileged in preventing
corporation's payment of excessive fee to plaintiff).
88. See, e.g., Swager v. Couri, 77 I11. 2d 173, 191, 395 N.E.2d 921, 928 (1979) (corporate
directors were privileged in liquidating bankrupt corporation because of their duty to shareholders,
and the consequent breach of contract with plaintiff architect held not actionable under the
doctrine of tortious interference with contract). The Swager opinion provides a history of tor-
tious interference with contractual relations and discusses the leading case of Loewenthal Sec.
Co. v. White Paving Co., 351 II. 285, 184 N.E. 310 (1932). Swager, 77 Ill. 2d at 188, 395
N.E.2d at 927. In Loewenthal, the court refused to find tortious interference with contract
since the corporate officers acted "in accordance with their business judgment and discretion,"
and such action thus lacked the "requisite malice." 351 I11. at 300, 184 N.E. at 316; see also
Connaughton v. Gertz, 94 I11. App. 3d 265, 418 N.E.2d 858 (1st Dist. 1981) (labor union justified
in coercing its members to strike, because company had violated its collective bargaining agree-
ment by hiring nonunion employees); Worrick v. Flora, 133 111. App. 2d 755, 758, 372 N.E.2d
708, 711 (3d Dist. 1971) (employee's termination of plaintiff's employment contract held to
be done within the scope of employment and, thus, was privileged); Petit v. Cuneo, 290 Ill.
App. 16, 21, 7 N.E.2d 774, 776 (1st Dist. 1937) (stockholder justified in influencing corpora-
tion's executive committee to reduce plaintiff's fee, because the stockholder had "a legitimate
interest in the amount of compensation to be paid plaintiff").
89. See, e.g., Connaughton v. Gertz, 94 Il1. App. 3d 265, 418 N.E.2d 858 (1st Dist. 1981).
In Connaughton, a union used threats to prevent its members from working for a company
that had begun to hire nonunion employees. The court discussed two factors necessary to establish
a privilege to interfere with a contract:
First, a third party may purposely bring about a breach of plaintiff's contract with
another when he is acting to protect a conflicting interest that is considered under
the law to be of a value equal to or greater than plaintiff's contractual rights.
• ..Second, the third party's acts that bring about the breach must be legal acts
and must not be unreasonable in the circumstances.
Id. at 270, 418 N.E.2d at 861 (citations omitted). The court held that, in promoting the strike,
the union acted to protect "its members' own valid contractual rights with the employer
. .. [and] was privileged to use any reasonable means to bring about a breach of plaintiffs'
contract." Id. (emphasis added).
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(usually a competitor) for wrongfully hiring the former's employee; and (3)
when the employer sues the employee for stealing its customers or clients.
In Pinsof v. Pinsof,9 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
considered a claim for tortious interference with a lifetime employment con-
tract. The plaintiff, who had served as executive vice-president and assistant
secretary of Sipi Corporation for forty-eight years, was removed by the board
of directors. 9 ' His interference claim was predicated on the existence of an
employment contract, evidenced by a stock purchase agreement and a death
benefit agreement.92 The court held that these agreements were insufficient
to constitute an enforceable employment contract, however, and dismissed
the complaint because the plaintiff failed to allege any other relationships
with the corporation. 3
The Pinsof court adopted the previously discussed hybrid formulation of
interference with contract and interference with prospective advantage.94 The
court acknowledged that the Pinsof complaint would not have been dismis-
sed had the plaintiff alleged the existence of an expectancy interest or an
employment contract terminable at will. 9 In light of Pinsof, the practitioner
may find it advisable to plead interference claims in the alternative. For ex-
ample, if a plaintiff is unable to establish the existence of an enforceable
contract, he should allege the existence of a prospective relationship or a
contract terminable at will. Although claims for interference based on these
relational interests are not as protected as those based on contract rights,
plaintiffs who assert such claims may avoid the fate of the plaintiff in the
Pinsof case.
In Ancraft Products Co. v. Universal Oil Products Col, 91 the court con-
sidered two related claims arising out of an employment relationship:
customer-stealing and employee-stealing. Ancraft, a machinery design and
manufacturing corporation, brought suit against one of its customers, Univer-
sal Oil Products Company, and a competitor, Peerless Metal Fabricators, Inc.
90. 107 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 438 N.E.2d 525 (lst Dist. 1982).
91. Id. at 1032, 438 N.E.2d at 526.
92. Id. at 1032-33, 438 N.E.2d at 526-27.
93. Id. at 1034-35, 438 N.E.2d at 529.
94. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. This hybrid formula was originally set
forth in City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 13 III. App. 3d 359, 300 N.E.2d
331 (3d Dist. 1973), when the City of Rock Falls sought to demolish an allegedly unsafe building
held in trust by the defendant. The defendant counterclaimed, alleging that the city had in-
terfered with his business advantages, leading to the building's deterioration, primarily because
the mayor had failed in his attempt to purchase the building. The mayor threatened "that
anyone buying the property would not recieve cooperation from the City ... and would 'prob-
ably find it difficult to function.'" Id. at 361-62, 300 N.E.2d at 332. The mayor (or other
city officials) subsequently refused applications for building permits, told prospective tenants
that the building was unavailable, ordered repairmen working on the building to stop all repairs,
and told the owner "that no permits for repairs or remodeling would be issued to him." Id.
at 362, 300 N.E.2d at 333. The court found that the counterclaim adequately stated a cause
of action for tortious interference.
95. Pinsof, 107 111. App. 3d at 1036, 438 N.E.2d at 528.
96. 84 111. App. 3d 836, 405 N.E.2d 1162 (lst Dist. 1980).
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Mr. Virta, an engineer and designer for Ancraft, supervised certain jobs
for Universal. After Virta, who also owned forty-nine percent of Ancraft's
stock, unsuccessfully attempted to acquire Ancraft, Universal asked him to
submit a manufacturing bid on behalf of Ancraft. 9' Without consulting the
owner of Ancraft, Virta acted as Ancraft's agent in submitting the bid, and,
subsequently, informed Universal that he was leaving Ancraft. Universal then
hired Virta. His departure, along with the loss of other Ancraft employees
who accepted jobs with Peerless, eventually destroyed Ancraft's business. 9
Ancraft had argued that the timing of its employees' departure indicated
that the defendants induced these employees to terminate their employment,
thereby tortiously interfering with its employment contracts. Failing to find
this argument convincing in light of the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the employment relationship,99 the court upheld summary judgment
against plaintiff.' 0 First, the court indicated that Ancraft failed to show
that Universal had acted improperly.' 0 ' Second, the evidence that did exist
tended to show that Universal acted cautiously, going so far as to consult
legal counsel before hiring Virta. Third, Virta had made the initial contact
with Universal to offer his services. Moreover, the court noted, Virta had
good cause to leave Ancraft, even in the absence of any inducement by the
defendants,' 2 since he had not been able to gain control of the company.
The court further found no evidence that defendants induced the other
employees to leave Ancraft, because these employees "had no specialized
skills beyond their ability as competent machinists,"'0 3 and left Ancraft
because there was little work after Virta left the company.
The lesson of Ancraft is that the existence of suspicious circumstances
does not establish an adequate basis on which to ground an interference
claim. Nevertheless, in determining the merits of an interference claim, courts
will look to the surrounding circumstances, such as the decline in profitability
of the business claimant. Therefore, it appears that in the absence of business
reasons why employees or customers might terminate a business relation-
ship, courts will be more likely to scrutinize the actions of competitors. Fur-
thermore, in cases in which plaintiffs can establish the existence of ques-
tionable conduct on the part of competitors or employees, courts will be
more likely to grant relief.
REPRESENTATIVE "COMMERCIAL" DECISIONS
Employees and competitors are not the only parties that may deprive a
business of existing or prospective benefits to which it is entitled. Many in-
97. Id. at 845-46, 405 N.E.2d at 1168.
98. Id. at 845, 405 N.E.2d at 1168.
99. Id. at 845-46, 405 N.E.2d at 1169.
100. Id. at 845, 405 N.E.2d at 1168.
101. Id. at 846, 405 N.E.2d at 1169.
102. Id. at 845, 405 N.E.2d at 1169.
103. Id.
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terference actions result from the relationship of a businessman or profes-
sional to customers or clients. These actions can be roughly grouped into
three classes: (1) when the customer or client attempts to circumvent the
business or professional relationship by dealing directly with third parties
in order to avoid paying fees or commissions; (2) when a competitor tries
to capture more business by intervening in the plaintiff's relationship with
a customer; and (3) when a third party prevents clients or customers from
doing business with the plaintiff.
The first class of cases usually involves attorneys, agent-representatives
and realtors. It is not uncommon for businessmen to deal with third parties
through these intermediaries and later attempt to deal directly with the third
party.'"" In so doing, the client or customer may deprive the representative
of his rightful compensation. For instance, in Thorne v. Elmore,"' a real
estate broker attempted to sell certain properties to a corporate client, whose
attorney attended the negotiations. After the parties failed to consummate
the sale, the corporate attorney's limited partnership purchased the proper-
ties in question."0 6 The plaintiff-broker sued the corporate attorney for depriv-
ing him of his commission on the sale.' 7 In affirming the lower court's
ruling against the plaintiff, the appellate court found that there was no con-
tractual relationship and no reasonable expectancy of a business relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the corporation at the time of the purchase.' 8
The court concluded that Thorne had abandoned the relationship after the
prior negotiations proved unsuccessful, and, therefore, the corporation's at-
torney, also a real estate broker, was free to purchase the properties.' 9
The Thorne court's rationale suggests that the plaintiff might have been
successful if the sale had taken place closer in time to the breakdown of
the prior negotiations, when the previous relationship was still in existence." '
Alternatively, if Thorne had maintained contact with the corporation after
104. See, e.g., Herman v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 41 I11. 2d 468, 244 N.E.2d 809
(1969) (insurance company dealt directly with attorneys' clients); Clifton-Strode, No. 2, Inc.
°v. Kent, 110 11. App. 3d 525, 442 N.E.2d 666 (3d Dist. 1982) (original real estate dealer denied
commissions after vendor and purchaser closed the deal directly).
105. 79 I1l. App. 3d 333, 398 N.E.2d 837 (1st Dist. 1980).
106. Id. at 345-46, 398 N.E.2d at 844-45.
107. Id. at 346, 398 N.E.2d at 845.
108. Id. at 334-35, 398 N.E.2d at 840.
109. Id. at 345-46, 398 N.E.2d at 845.
110. An offer received by Thorne in January 1972 was not allowed in evidence and Thorne
took no action when a previous offer fell through. Apparently, no attempts were made by
Thorne between January and April, when the final transaction was completed. In analyzing
these facts, the court concluded:
The relationship was apparently abandoned by Thorne after the Butler deal col-
lapsed. To hold Elmore liable for a breach would be to hold that, although there
was no specific agreement to do so, the corporations having once unsuccessfully
dealt through Thorne were not at liberty to sell their property without his involve-
ment, in spite of his inactivity in that regard. Such a conclusion is neither reasonable
nor supported by the evidence.
Id. at 346, 398 N.E.2d at 848.
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the collapse of the initial deal, the court might have construed this contact
as constituting a continuing relationship. Therefore, the best way for plain-
tiffs to avoid the Thorne result is to obtain a written agreement at the outset
from the client or prospective client. Such an agreement should identify the
nature of the relationship between the two parties.
The second class of commercial cases, appropriately termed "customer-
stealing" cases, is illustrated by Candalaus Chicago v. Evans Mill Supply
Co." In Candalaus, the defendant-distributor (Evans) counterclaimed against
the plaintiff-manufacturer (Candalaus) for interference with business
relationships." 2 Candalaus had been supplying Evans with paper products
which Evans then resold to its own customers, who were also distributors
of paper products. Candalaus subsequently cut Evans out of the transaction
and began selling directly to Evan's customers." 3 In fact, Evans contended
that some of the goods sold in this manner still bore Evans's name or logo.
The trial court found for Evans,"' but the appellate court reversed, listing
a number of reasons. First, Evans's customers also were distributors and
not retail stores or outlets. Second, in the paper products industry it was
common for a manufacturer to sell to a customer of one of its own
customers. Additionally, the parties had not entered into an exclusive deal-
ing arrangement. Consequently, Candalaus and Evans were competitors with
regard to these customers."' The court concluded that liability could be im-
posed on Candalaus only after a showing that it acted maliciously and that
it was not acting to further its own interests." 6 Evans was not able to make
such a showing.
Candalaus demonstrates the extent to which competitors may actively pur-
sue business and financial gain. Only if the competitor acts solely out of
"malice," used here in the sense of improper motives, will liability be
imposed."' Thus, even when malice is the primary motivation underlying
a transaction or series of transactions, liability will not be imposed on a
competitor who is marginally furthering its own business interests." 8
The third class of commercial cases usually involves the actions of unions
in boycotting, or encouraging others to boycott, a particular business.
Although much of the law in this area has been preempted by federal statute,
cases continue to arise. Most of this litigation deals with nonunion groups
that are engaged in boycotting activities. In Dugan Oil Co. v. Coalition of
111. 51 111. App. 3d 38, 366 N.E.2d 319 (1st Dist. 1977); see also Doremus v. Hennessey,
176 Ill. 608, 54 N.E. 924 (1898).
112. Candalaus, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 40, 366 N.E.2d at 321.
113. Id. at 48, 366 N.E.2d at 327.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 49, 366 N.E.2d at 327.
116. Id. The court relied on Doremus v. Hennessey, 176 Ill. 608, 54 N.E. 924 (1898), for
the requirement that malice on the part of the alleged interferor is an essential element of the
tort of interference with a business relationship.
117. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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Area Labor,"9 a public interest group boycotted all local Shell service sta-
tions because Shell operated an area mine staffed by nonunion laborers. The
trial court enjoined the boycott because of the irreparable damage being in-
flicted on the service station owners; the appellate court affirmed this
decision.' 0 Particularly since the boycott was directed at "neutral" parties-
the small businessmen who operated the stations-rather than at Shell, the
court held that the constitutional right to "freedom of speech in the form
of picketing"'"' did not outweigh the individual gas station owner's right
to operate his business free of interference.' 22 Thus, the relationship between
the parties and the directness and severity of the injury inflicted appear to
be significant factors, in determining liability for boycott activities.' 23
CONCLUSION
Tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospec-
tive advantage are unique causes of action that combine elements of tort
and contract law. By compensating plaintiffs for interferences with existing
and expected future business relationships, these causes of action preserve
the common law right to enter into and perform lawful contracts. The in-
terference torts, therefore, help delineate the limits of free competition.
In Illinois, courts have addressed interferences stemming from both ex-
isting contracts and prospective business relationships. Terminable at will
contracts are protected in this same manner. Illinois courts, however, do
permit a high degree of interference with prospective advantages. Thus, Il-
linois' approach is more restrictive than that of California, but more liberal
than that of New York.
As in other states, Illinois courts allow successful plaintiffs to recover con-
sequential damages, loss of profits, and, within narrow limits, punitive
damages. If the defendant possesses an equal or superior right to that of
the plaintiff, however, the interference may be justified or "privileged," and,
therefore, not actionable.
As competitive and economic pressures increasingly come to bear on
119. 98 Ill. App. 3d 126, 423 N.E.2d 1373 (4th Dist. 1981).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 131, 423 N.E.2d at 1377.
122. The Dugan court relied on Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957);
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milkwagon Drivers' Union of Chicago No. 753, 371 111. 377,
21 N.E.2d 308 (1939), aff'd, 312 U.S. 287 (1941), and several other Illinois decisions to sup-
port its holding that nonviolent secondary boycotts of a neutral employer may be enjoined.
The court stated that a secondary boycott "violate[s] a well-established policy of [the] State
• . . the policy which recognizes that a person's business is considered 'property' and is entitled
to protection from harm." Dugan, 98 II1. App. 3d at 134, 423 N.E.2d at 1379. The court
adopted the requirement for prospective advantage set out in City of Rock Falls v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 13 111. App. 3d 359, 300 N.E.2d 311 (1973), see supra notes 58 and 94)
and held that, in the instant case, these conditions were "clearly" satisfied. Dugan, 98 Ill.
App. 3d at 134, 423 N.E.2d at 1379.
123. See supra notes 78 and 89 and accompanying text.
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American business, instances of actionable interference claims almost cer-
tainly will continue to increase. Further development in the law may serve
to eliminate some of the inconsistencies and confusion currently surround-
ing these torts. In seeking to strike a balance between the necessities of
modern business and the mandates of fair competition, courts will play an
important role in shaping the business environment of the future.

